In this conversation, Brian Ferguson shares his extensive journey in the real estate industry, detailing his transition from single-family investments to multifamily syndication. He discusses the importance of communication and trust with investors, the challenges faced in the current market, and the lessons learned from both successful and difficult deals. Brian emphasizes the need for a personalized approach in investor relations and critiques common practices in asset management fees and preferred returns.

What Being an LP Taught Me About Raising Capital with Brian Ferguson

Joe Guidi (00:01)

Brian, thanks so much for joining me. Yeah, I'm looking forward to our conversation. Obviously we had a chance to catch up a little bit earlier, so I'm looking forward to diving into your journey. Before we get started, I'd love for you to just take a minute and introduce yourself to our audience and anyone who might not know of you.

Brian H Ferguson (00:03)

Yeah, man. Thanks for having me on. Sure. So, Brian Ferguson. Our company is Fergmar Enterprises and Fergmar Capital. We've been in the real estate space in some form or fashion since starting in '05, so almost two decades ago. Started out just as a side business, fix and flip. And then that transitioned over time into—we ended up with quite about a 150 single-family portfolio that we—some houses we couldn't sell, and then we started growing that portfolio.

Fast forward over that 15-year period, we eventually 1031'd out of those and started buying multifamily just for scalability purposes. And then over time, we have a ground-up division, did some ground-up land development. So we've been in multiple different facets in the Victoria, Texas area. And then we transitioned into pure multifamily and shopping centers in the past five or so years. We're currently in the Victoria, Texas market, Katy, Texas right outside of Houston there in shopping centers, and then recently moved into Kingsville and some other smaller markets like Victoria in multifamily.

Joe Guidi (01:24)

Awesome. And so when you first got started, it sounds like you were doing—were you raising capital when you first got started?

Brian H Ferguson (01:32)

No, so we actually did not raise any. The first deal we did with outside capital—outside, I mean, private investors or lenders over time, but as a syndication model or JV model—our first deal with outside capital was in '22 on a shopping center we bought. So about a little over three years ago now.

Joe Guidi (01:51)

Awesome. Why do you start to make the shift? Walk me through—you've been doing it for a long time without that model, and then you make the shift to bringing in LPs. What was the motivation there?

Brian H Ferguson (02:01)

So, without getting too long-winded in it, what would happen is when we decided we wanted to get out of the single-family front, the market was really good. You could go put 5, 10, 15 houses on the market out of this portfolio we had. And we didn't owe a lot of anything on some of these because we'd bought them—these were tax sales back in '05, '06, you know, you're buying for 10,000 bucks. But there was enough capital to go buy something of scale, because what we didn't want to do is sell something and then go buy another fourplex.

But then what happened eventually as you started selling that off, we built a pretty nice portfolio, but you'd sell something and all you'd have in this whole six-month period is a couple hundred thousand dollars. Well, I'm not buying anything even with bank leverage—I'm not going to buy what I want for a couple hundred thousand dollars in cash. So I started—we started doing some private lending, lending to other people that were getting started in fix and flip. And then I started putting my money as an LP in other people's deals.

I knew the syndication world but never really paid a lot of attention to it. I started paying more attention, going to some conferences, meeting some people. And then I had met some other guys. From time to time, I would have people approach me that they wanted to be passive. That's not what they were calling it. They were just like, "Hey, I have money. I want to invest in real estate. I don't want to do the work." I'm like, we now call that being an LP. A lot of guys had mentioned this over time. I had a couple of brothers that had mentioned this to me. There was a shopping center deal that had popped up, brought it to them, and a group of us bought that. Then a couple more deals went that way, and then I started getting the referrals—people calling me saying, "Hey, I heard you did this deal with so-and-so. I have some money I'd like to invest." We were just doing it deal by deal. Then eventually we learned, "Okay, we don't have some type of active deal flow." We can't just buy it only because what I was doing was "I have money, so I want to go buy something. Now I'll ask if anyone else wants to put money in." Well, that doesn't service their needs of when they have money they need to deploy. So we've just gotten more intentional about how we do it now, starting about last year, where that's when we really created the Fergmar Capital side of it and we're taking investors full-time now.

Joe Guidi (04:07)

Got it. Interesting. So the shift there was that you started as an LP, really, is what you're saying. You got exposed to syndication through deploying your own money and realizing, "Geez, this could work for my business."

Brian H Ferguson (04:15)

Yeah. Well, I thought that I was going to be done. I'd gotten a divorce in '16. I'm remarried now, I have an amazing family. But I got my divorce, started slowing down a little bit, started putting the money as the LP. When me and my wife now started dating, I was traveling a lot with her. I thought, "You know, I've done well enough. I'm just going to be done." And then that worked for a year or two and I'm like, "Eh, okay, that was fun, but I'm not ready to be done." Like, I still want to be—I mean, I'm 39 right now. I'll be 40 in January. So this was when I was 35. I thought I was ready and the LP thing worked out fine. I just wasn't ready to be done. I still wanted to be active. Our experience of almost 20 years now is in operations and in management, and that's what we thrive off of. So it was tough for me to just write a check and then watch what happened.

See, I'm the LP that dives into the financials in depth. I ask for the full set. And then I see variances and I'm like, "Well, did y'all try this? Did you do this?" and I could tell I was starting to annoy some of the GPs in this situation. I was not passive. I'd make trips—I had a deal in Houston, I'd go down there just to grab lunch and drive through the property. I was like, "This isn't for me, not yet." So that's what transitioned me. And then, like I said, we had a group of guys, we found the shopping center. It was good timing. It worked out and we bought that and the deal worked out really well, bought another one, another one, and then just became full-time.

Joe Guidi (05:50)

So in your experience as an LP early on, I'm curious as to how that shaped your approach to bringing in your own LPs. How did your own experiences as an LP shape your approach to bringing on your own LPs?

Brian H Ferguson (06:15)

You know, it's really—I know it shaped it and what I thought was great, and then I came in to realize I was wrong. So I'll say that. But what I did is I took all my notes when I did this and I thought, "Okay, I've done this. I put my money out here. I know what I do like, what I don't like. I know what I like about how they communicate. Here's the things I'd want to see more of." So I wrote what I thought was the Fergmar Capital playbook on how we're going to communicate to LPs based on exactly what I wanted to see and what I thought I didn't see enough of.

Now, if you fast-forward that, I'll say that was a big issue because I tried to communicate with—whether it be two people or 20 people or a hundred people—I was communicating to all of them exactly on my playbook of what I wanted to see. Until I had someone at a breakfast tell me that I was virtually annoying them and that I was making this a full-time job for them. I never realized that. I still think some of the knowledge I gained—I still think there's certain things that these GPs could have done better. But then I've also realized there were certain things that they weren't communicating that now I don't communicate. I don't send out a full 85-page P&L document set in every update. If you ask for it, I'll send it to you, but I don't send it to everyone in the deal because now I know they don't want to see that.

Joe Guidi (07:36)

Sure. Like they're deploying their money so you can handle it. So, double-clicking on that a little bit, what you're saying is: you're the guy that's diving into the details, hounding the GP for information. You thought, "Okay, I'm going to jump in here. I'm not going to make people hound me for information. I'm just going to give it all to them." And some of them like that, and some of them were like, "Hey, net it out for me."

Brian H Ferguson (08:11)

He literally told me that. He said, "You told me this was going to be: I write you a check, you go make me money." He goes, "Now this is a job." And in that same conversation, we were talking about a future deal coming up, and he was explaining this to me on why he was having hesitation about writing another check. He's like, "I get I'm making money, but I don't want to have to do all this." I was like, "Well, it's not expected of you to do the work. I just sent it in case you wanted it." He was like, "Well, I don't want to see all that." He goes, "Now when my distributions stop, I may come to your office and have a different conversation." He said, "But you know, this is generational money." He goes, "I'm not the one coming to your office. I'm going to bring in my people and they'll come sit in your office and look through financials if things get bad."

And then he also told me in the same setting—because he had one of his very close friends, and normally if one of them writes a check the other one does—I couldn't get the other guy interested at all. He said, "The problem is you bring us in there and you have these 85-page presentations about the deal and all the numbers. We leave there and we're confused." He goes, "We just want you to sit us down, look us in the eye, explain it to us." And I'm like, "So you don't want to see—" He said, "I want to see one page of what my returns will be based on how much of a check I write." I'm like, "So you don't want to see the other 78 pages of research and comps and stress tests?" and he's like, "Nope, we don't want to see any of that."

But then I've got the other side of the spectrum. So I'm very diligent on—I try to meet them where they are. I take notes, we use HubSpot. I try to make sure I put diligent notes in there and I go back and look at those notes before I have a phone call with someone because I move a thousand miles an hour sometimes and what I don't want to do is what I used to do: I'd get on the call and I could immediately tell where I lost interest in a phone call. I either didn't give them what they wanted and so they lost trust in me, or it wasn't a trust factor; it was "this guy's annoying me with too much data and I just don't want to talk anymore." So it is tough because you have to realize it. I can want what I want as an LP when I'm writing a check, but that doesn't mean that these other a hundred people have to want the same thing. I have to be very intentional on that. Because if not, I will get fascinated on these certain details of a deal that are very important to me, not so important to them.

Joe Guidi (10:26)

Right. Well, I think there's a lot of truth that I've heard a lot of other GPs—this is a topic that comes up a lot. It's: where's the line on what to communicate and what not to communicate? We can jump into that a little bit more in a second. But I think what you're saying is even further up in the process. Usually when we're having that conversation, it's while the deal is operating—like, where's the line on what to communicate when something's going wrong or sideways? Obviously you want transparency, but you don't want to overwhelm people. You're saying even earlier in the process, you're taking into account what type of person you are talking to. When do you start that?

Brian H Ferguson (11:19)

So I'll tell you where. When we're building our OM—some people call it a pitch deck—we've gone back and forth on how much data we put in there. I've taken stuff out and then someone asked, so I put it back in. Well, I recently went to the Passive Pockets conference and I met a group of people from New York. They have like an investor group—there's about 20 of them and they view deals together, invest in deals together. It's like their own little private group. Anyway, I flew up there and hosted a dinner just to have dinner with them. And I told them, "I'm not looking for a check from anyone. I just want your feedback because you've all seasoned 10, 15, 20, 30 years of doing this."

The amount of things that they asked for was insane that I just didn't think about. They wanted more back history about this. So I added like 30 pages to this OM. Then I send it out and I have a group of local guys that are in other deals, and I had half of them in some form or fashion tell me, "Why did you make this thing so long?" and I'm like, "Okay." So I'm not saying I figured this out. It's still a battle of: I want to make sure I have enough data.

Even in the beginning, it's one thing if they're sitting in front of me at a conference table and they're local and I know them—our kids go to school together. I would say if they have money to deploy, 99% of the time they're going to deploy something into the deal. But where I've learned is the battle is when you're dealing with these people that you don't know, that maybe you've met one time at a conference or they were referred and you've never met them in person, and you're sending them this OM. What they're looking for is completely different than the person sitting in your conference room. So we've even talked about: do you have a simplified version and an in-depth version? But then how do you explain which is which? It's a problem we realize on what you give to them.

I wouldn't say that we have a surefire way, but every time I send it, I follow up. I personally call them and say, "Hey, let's talk through it. Let me jump on a screen." And I just try to pay attention. As we're going through a page, if I see no interest, I scroll a little bit faster. When they start asking questions, I try to slow down on that page. But we did—our investor relations, Lauren, helped—we built out this questionnaire. I have what I think is a pretty good questionnaire and I've added in those questions of what data they look for. "What are the most important things you look for in an OM? What are the two to three important things you look for when you get quarterly updates, outside of the distribution?" What is the data you're looking for inside that update? And I try to just compile that and make sure I'm sending them. But again, it's not a permanent solution just because if you have 250 investors, you can't send them all something different.

Joe Guidi (14:10)

Yeah, that's definitely true. What it seems like if I was to zoom out a little bit is: the difference-maker is trust, right? You're dealing with a group of seasoned investors who are used to just looking at deals. They don't know you; they don't know the operator. They're literally doing it based on the deal. Every little piece matters because they're using that as a proxy to evaluate whether or not the operator has their head on their shoulders. Whereas when you're talking to someone in your neighborhood or someone that you've built a relationship with, they kind of already in their mind are saying you have your head on your shoulders, and so they just want to know what's the deal.

Brian H Ferguson (14:57)

Yeah, because I'll literally tell you: "I'm trusting you." I had a guy drop off some checks the other day. He literally told me, "I will only drop off these cashier's checks with you." and I'm like, "Okay." He shook my hand, he looked me in the eye and he said, "I'm giving—I'm just trusting you in this deal." But it's a good deal. I don't even know if he'd have the metrics memorized. Whereas that group I'm emailing it to, I can promise you they know every detail.

Joe Guidi (15:28)

Yeah, they're dissecting it. They're operating almost like a mini-institution where they're doing that deal-level due diligence. Whereas most passive investors, I think, are doing sponsor-level due diligence on the retail LP side. One thing that we hear a lot on this show is the idea of passivity. It seems like personally you would agree with that in your own approach—passive investments aren't really passive in the sense that there's legwork to be done upfront. But on some level, once trust has been established with the operator, that's when there can be a certain level of passivity.

Brian H Ferguson (16:27)

I think it depends on the person heavily. The guys that exited a medical company and are putting half a million dollars into a deal, and their net worth is tens and tens of millions—it's easier for them to be passive because it's not worth their time. They'd probably still be really upset if they lost that money, but they're not going to dig in. Whereas that is something you have to be very aware of.

I just recently took some money from a guy that owns a ton of rental property. I already know that our conversation is going to have to be a little different because he's already asked: "When I get my updates, if we missed a budget line item on a make-ready, will I have the details on why we missed it?" and I'm like, "No, I won't actively send that to you in every email. But if you ask for it, it's here."

Joe Guidi (17:20)

It's not going to be in the report, but you can ask.

Brian H Ferguson (17:22)

No. If you want it, we're an open book. Monday through Friday, 8:00 to 5:00, and maybe some off-hours, my team will print whatever you want. You are a partner in this deal. I'm fully transparent with that, but you just have to be aware of who that is. I know a lot of people go, "Okay, my avatar is this and I only focus on this." I've actually had people that have called and we've had a meeting, and I don't know if they would have invested or not, but I didn't follow up because I just don't think they would be a good fit for us.

Then there's the ones where I go, "Okay, it's going to take a little bit more work." They're going to call and text more, especially on the first deal. Now, once distributions are going great, those calls are probably slow down a little bit, but you just have to be prepared. If you don't want to take those phone calls from a—I hear people call them a "needy LP"—I don't know that that's the terminology I would use. They're just—to your point—the trust isn't there yet. Go earn and build the trust and they'll probably not bug you as much on the details.

Joe Guidi (18:22)

Yeah, we'll call it involved. There should be a little bit of anxiety when someone deploys money with you. They don't know for a fact—these deals are not risk-free. Until they see how you perform, it makes sense that they're a little more involved. So on that note, obviously you haven't been taking other people's money for that long. But obviously the market is in an interesting spot. Challenging environment. A lot of LPs are anxious, and a lot of deals haven't performed exactly to the pro forma. Have you had to deal with that—LPs coming to you being like, "Hey, are we all right?" and have there been any adjustments you've had to make and how did you communicate those?

Brian H Ferguson (19:18)

Yeah, so, all the above. What has helped us is that we went through this cycle—we got into the business during this cycle. Luckily, whenever I went through that '05, '06, '07, '08 cycle, I was not married, I did not have children, I did not have debt, I had savings. I would not have wanted to go through this cycle with the size of our portfolio without that experience, because I think it could have ended very differently. We saw the writing on the wall. We saw the slowdown.

We did a reduction in force on like our big development company. We had 40 spec houses and all of a sudden nothing is selling. So we immediately started—one person is now going to do three people's jobs. We went to people that had been here a long time and said, "Hey, you remember 10, 15 years ago when we all worked 60 hours a week? We're back there. We've got to let go of so-and-so." So we had to make a bunch of big changes.

I'm a big proponent that when we underwrite deals, the interest rate environment doesn't matter if it's a fixed rate. If it's 18% interest and the deal underwrites at 18% interest, then it's going to underwrite better at 8% interest. So I didn't let that scare me. We also—our capital or syndication company has shared resources from every other asset in the building for the most part. They all have other jobs and get paid off of other revenue streams. So if I don't have a deal for 12 months, it's fine.

We underwrote and if they didn't work, they didn't work. I definitely feel for the guys where the new fees or the new deals coming in is what paid payroll. I truly do. Some of these guys that are in a bad spot now—I get that, because if any of our one revenue streams was the only one, it would have been really tough. But I'd say one of our biggest flaws was one of our first. We did the shopping center as our first multifamily deal. It was a smaller deal. We underwrote it a bit too aggressively. It was the only deal we ever did floating debt on. We're actually just fixing to close the refi on it probably Thursday or Friday.

We bought this in January of '23. It was a higher interest rate and it underwrote to that, but what we learned was—we learned that the door number count, it being 56 units... we have a bunch of small stuff and then we have 100-plus stuff. We never had that middle-of-the-road that didn't have the budget for on-site staff. But then what we learned is a fraudulent seller and that we were being too trustworthy. It took about six months to get the deal closed because they found stuff in his P&Ls. Freddie Mac pulled out of the deal because he wasn't at the occupancy he said. So we had to last-minute transition to a cash deal and then went and got some bridge debt on it so we could stabilize it.

If I could go backwards, we should have just walked. Now what we do differently is we walk every single unit, and then if it goes past so many days, we walk every single unit again, because this guy had put ghost leases in places. These units were trashed. That had happened from the day we walked it to when we closed. I mean, the guy should—actually, I'm pretty sure the guy ended up going to prison, because this was one of like 19 deals that he had go south.

Our attorneys were like, "You'll spend more in legal fees—what are you going to get from the guy?" They've been going after him for two years now. So, we learned the hard way there. And what I was getting to on that was: this was the first multifamily deal, the first deal where I went to a bunch of people at 50 and a hundred thousand. And this deal has yet to give distributions. We've had to learn to be very honest and open about why we are. Like, that's a deal that had asset management fees into it—I'd love to touch on that for a minute because I'm not an asset management guy. I don't believe in them or pref, but people kick me for that one. We paused our fees, we took them all off the table, we'll probably never end up charging them. On that deal, I'll give up my ownership percentage to try to get them as whole as possible. It extended our hold time by about two years. It'll still be a good deal, but it was definitely a lesson for us. Thinking we've been doing this years and years and years, we had never dealt with someone that was intentionally being fraudulent as a seller. I think we've dealt with some good sellers over an 18-year period and we were more trusting than we should have been. Now, even when we have good sellers, we play hardball. I'd rather the seller be upset at me than putting LPs' equity in danger. So that was a hard one.

Joe Guidi (24:04)

So sounds like the deal is going to come out okay in the end, but a longer hold time and a lot of angst in the meantime. How early did you start communicating about that?

Brian H Ferguson (24:26)

I would say—because when we first started finding these leases, it took us about six months to really get through all these ghost leases and start seeing where the overages were really going to come on capex. It was twofold: we didn't have the income coming in, but then now the capex was higher than we thought because these units—we don't know to this day, did they intentionally go in there and trash them or did they let...

I think what we think happened is they were trying to maintain the 90% and they were running all these specials. We just were like, "Well, it's their property, they can do what they want." That's not the case anymore. We definitely put in all of our contracts that once we sign a contract, we have to communicate on what leases you're signing because we're inheriting these. I think they were just putting people in with no deposit, no money, no nothing. We're just putting warm bodies in there to meet the check, and they just trashed the place.

It probably took us into the second or third quarter because that's when we really had an understanding of how bad this was and we started communicating it. I did send out updates, but if I could go back and do it again—there's say 25 people in the deal. I had another GP that had actually brought us the deal because they knew it was in our market. Half of them are their LPs, but at least on our half—which should have been a phone call. That's a situation that didn't warrant an email. We communicated, sure, but was it enough? We should have picked up the phone. We owed them each a 30-minute conversation. "Let me explain to you what really happened." They'd got the emails and then I'd run into people and they'd ask what's going on. You start explaining it and you could tell: I'm not sure they got all that from the email. And so I would have definitely done that differently if I could go back and do it again. If it happened again, that's exactly how we'd do it—phone call by phone call.

Joe Guidi (26:26)

It seems like your approach overall is every iteration of learning you've had is about personalization—being more sensitive to what they actually need from us and how they want to communicate. Bringing a very relational lens on the LP/GP relationship.

Brian H Ferguson (26:55)

100%. We have a saying. Our portfolio is like 120 million assets under management, and about 80 million of it is non-investor, individually owned by me or my original business partner. It's a much larger pool. But when we first started doing this, I'll never forget, we sat at a table with my leadership team and we had to talk about parking lot repair. We needed something done at multiple properties and we didn't have enough vendors because we are vendor-restrained in our market.

One of the people at the table said, "Well, we'll send them to the corporate-owned properties first because we own a hundred percent of those versus 20% of the syndicated ones." and I'm like, "Hold on a second. You're completely wrong." I look at it completely opposite. If I lose money over here, that was my decision to do it. I'm not saying I won't lose sleep, but not as much. I've taken these people's money and that's what causes the most loss in sleep every night: am I—are we going to perform to what we promised these people?

Especially the checks where these people are giving it to you and they're like, "This is my retirement. I need these dividends to start kicking in in two to five years or I can't retire." You don't want to be—so now everybody in our building knows: syndicated properties go to the top of our list and then we worry about the rest of it. My team knows that, but how does the investor that was referred to you for the first time know or believe that?

Joe Guidi (28:36)

Ideally he just reads reviews on Invest Clearly and that's how he figures it out. All right, so let's talk asset management fees and pref. We have the question: what about passive investing needs to die?

Brian H Ferguson (29:07)

I will 100% lump it into that. Again, I can get shot all day long, that's fine. But I can open my underwriting sheet and plug in a 4% asset management fee and an 8% pref and they almost cancel each other out. I just don't understand putting a GP fee and an LP fee if they cancel each other out. I don't think they're properly aligned.

I get property management fees because we own a property management company, but we also third-party property manage in other markets. We hire whoever is the best property manager. We don't property manage for the fees. Property management is the most work in the deal. But for someone from asset management to get paid on the top line of the deal—that's where I've never—especially when I see a deal structured where I get my 4% asset management fee based on collected income. That is half the battle. You can be collecting at 100%, but if the expenses have just gone haywire, the deal can die based on that.

And pref is just—yes, it's a preferred return, but if the cash flow is not there, it's never going to happen. So what is aligning to make sure that we—so ours, we just do 80/20 splits. Every deal now, no extra fees, no nothing. It's 80/20. If we want to succeed, then we have to make sure your 80% grows and our 20% grows, plus we co-invest in the deal. I just think it's a cleaner structure. When I did LP deals, those are the type of deals I went for. And again, I've also been on phone calls recently where I literally had someone say, "No pref, no thanks," and they ended the phone call. I've had it happen a few times.

Joe Guidi (31:26)

The LP—and this comes back to the investor sensitivity thing—at least on the upfront conversations with retail, we shouldn't assume that they necessarily know what those numbers mean. It's kind of a little bit of a marketing play.

Brian H Ferguson (31:46)

They just know that their buddy and everyone else told them you have to have pref, and an eight pref is better than a seven and a 10 is better than an eight. But if cash-on-cash in the first five years of a five-year deal is sub 5%, what did any of those pref numbers mean? Nothing.

I just wish everyone would band together and let's make these deals less complicated for the retail investor. Because a lot of these retail investors, because they know the terminology, think that means they understand the deal. That doesn't mean you understand the numbers. Ask for the full underwriting sheet. You want to see the whole underwriting packet? I'll send you the whole spreadsheet, dive through it, but don't die on a hill about pref or asset management fees if you don't even understand.

I've had people go, "Oh, the IRR is too low." I'm like, "Well, what are your goals?" "My goals are to have X distributions." I'm like, "Well, then let's talk about the cash-on-cash." Or the people that focus solely on the multiple of the deal but they're going to live off this cash flow, and you're putting your money into a deal where all the upside comes from the exit.

I'm not saying pref can't be a good thing; I'm saying we normally don't structure it in. That being said, if I had the right-sized investor come to me and say, "I want to see an 8% pref," and I could throw in an asset management and it offsets it and that's what makes them happy with the deal and it doesn't change anyone's returns, I guess we'd consider it. But we don't normally put them in there at all. What I don't agree with is people coming in and saying, "No pref, the deal's dead to me," without even looking into it further. You could be missing out on a great deal over one little piece there.

Joe Guidi (33:37)

Right. Well, and the split in this case would be the neutralizer. All right. Well, this has been great. We probably should wrap it up. But before we do, why don't you let the audience know where they can find you.

Brian H Ferguson (33:45)

Sure, absolutely. Our fergmarcapital.com website is normally the best place. I'm also on LinkedIn and all your socials, but fergmarcapital.com has a call button, an email button, everything. And we'd love to visit, whether it's with other investors or other GPs that are listening to this. I love to just have conversations and learn.

Joe Guidi (34:15)

Good. All right, man. Well, thank you so much for your time.

Brian H Ferguson (34:17)

Yeah, thank you.