Jim P.
Level 4: Experienced VoiceReviews by Jim P.
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Solid Operator through Difficult Times
BAM Capital buys Midwest workforce apartments through pooled funds. My exposure is one 2021 fund of six properties, held in both of its share classes: an income class with a 10% monthly preferred return and a growth class with a 7% accruing preferred plus a share of the sale upside. The fund is still open. After about five years I have received roughly 0.3x of my capital in cash (about 0.5x on the income class and about 0.2x on the growth class), and no capital has been returned yet. The fund's own audited cumulative IRRs are 10.0% for the income class, which is on plan, and 5.9% for the growth class, against a 20% target and falling. In 2024 BAM refinanced all of its floating-rate bridge loans into long-term, rate-capped debt without a capital call. Occupancy is 93% and collections are 99%. The growth class did skip distributions in 2023 and only resumed them in mid-2024. Reporting is thorough: quarterly reports with property scorecards, annual audits, regular emails and yearly tax-timeline memos. Some of the less flattering items, though, appeared only in the latest audit, which came out late (July) and restated the prior year's accounting. One example: refinance proceeds were lent to the two weakest properties instead of being distributed. The quarterly reports can also read as promotional. Bottom line: BAM is a capable operator that protected capital through the rate cycle and has delivered the income class as promised. I would consider investing again, but I would discount growth-class projections and read the audit footnotes closely.
Top Tier Operator in Multiple Asset Classes
Aspen Funds runs several strategies. I made four investments with them between 2021 and 2023: a residential mortgage-note fund, a ground-up industrial development, a two-center retail value-add and an oil and gas fund. The note fund did exactly what it promised, paying a 9% preferred return every month for about 2.5 years and then redeeming me at par, for 1.21x and roughly a 9% IRR. The industrial development has returned 0.73x so far, almost all of it return of capital from a refinance and a building sale, and the remaining building is fully leased to a credit tenant. The energy fund has paid every quarter since 2023 (0.38x so far). The retail deal is the laggard: distributions have been suspended since 2024 and I have 0.05x back, though occupancy and income have improved materially. Reporting is a strength: quarterly letters with property financials and capital-account statements, and audited financials for the energy fund. Bad news comes early and with reasons; a 2025 distribution cut was explained when it happened, and a skipped December payment was announced a quarter ahead. The weak spots are energy-fund K-1s that have needed extensions three years running, an amended tax return, and retail updates that have never explained why record income isn't turning into cash or mentioned a loan event that shows up in the financial statements. Bottom line: A transparent, competent operator with solid results across very different asset classes. I like and trust Aspen and its principals and I will definitely invest with them again.
It could have been worse...
It could have been worse, is not a strong endorsement, but it's the truth! I invested through Ashcroft in a 2020 value-add apartment deal in the Tampa area. I held the growth-class equity. It sold in mid-2026 after about six years. I got 1.10x back in cash, a realized IRR of about 2.1%, against a plan of 2.0x and 16.2%. About 86% of my principal came back as capital and the rest came back as earlier distributions. A small escrow release may still add a little. The deal was financed with floating-rate debt, and the 2022-24 rate rise is what sank it: distributions were paused in late 2023, renovations stopped, and occupancy dropped into the mid-80s before recovering. Communication was frequent. There were monthly recaps for most of the hold, quarterly financials and rent rolls from 2024 on, and K-1s on time. When distributions stopped, Ashcroft explained why and paused its own fees. When it considered a capital call in late 2025, it spelled out the alternative plainly: an immediate sale at a loss of equity. The path to the exit was messy, though. A sale was launched, then pulled after low offers. A capital call was floated and then dropped. A group tax-deferred exchange was offered and then cancelled for lack of participation. Some recaps also struck an upbeat tone that the result did not bear out. Bottom line: The outcome was poor, but most of the damage came from a rate shock on floating debt. Compared to other deals of this vintage, it was an OK result - I was happy to get my capital back. The communication was candid and timely, so I might consider Ashcroft again, but only on deals with fixed-rate or conservatively hedged debt.
Resort Investing
Accountable Equity owns and operates Mid-Atlantic wedding-and-event resorts. It also raises fixed-coupon note funds that lend largely to its own affiliated businesses. I have four 2021-22 investments: two resort equity deals, a secured-note debt fund and an equipment-leasing note fund. Results split cleanly by structure. The equipment fund paid its 8% coupon every month and returned 100% of capital on schedule (1.15x, about an 8% IRR). The debt fund has paid its 10% coupon without a miss for nearly four years (0.38x so far, principal intact). The resort equity deals are a slower story: one is at 0.19x after more than five years and the other at 0.17x after four. Neither has returned any capital, a promised year-five recapitalization hasn't happened - I believe this is mostly a timing issue with post Covid, interest rate and broader economic issues. Since 2024 preferred returns have been cut to a token level and are accruing. Reporting was quarterly in 2021-22, then mostly annual and mid-year webinars in 2023-25, and quarterly again in 2026, mixed in with a steady stream of event invitations and reinvestment pitches. The recent updates give detailed revenue line items but no NOI, no occupancy against plan and no current valuation. To their credit, they announced and explained the distribution cut themselves, and every statement shows the accrued balances. What's missing is a concrete, dated plan to return equity investors. Bottom line: I'd consider their fixed-income notes again, keeping the affiliate lending in mind, but I will wait to invest in another resort equity deal until the existing ones return capital.